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COMMENTS
same constitutional restraints that are placed upon it in respect to
pnvate corporations."'
Again this was dictim, because the court held that the purchase of an interstate
bridge by a city was not a matter of purely local concern but was clearly of state
concern.
However, in an even more recent case," a statute fixing the minmum salary
for city waterworks commissioners was held invalid solely on the authority of the
Thompson case, as relating to a matter of purely local concern.
Prior to these two cases it would no doubt have been safe to conclude, on
the basis of the cases subsequent to the Thompson case, that the inherent rights
doctrine had been abandoned by the Kentucky Court. Such a conclusion is now
impossible. It seems that the doctrine has been rejuvenated with all the vitality
which it possessed when first advanced in the Thompson case. However, the scope
of the doctrine in Kentucky, as far as the writer is able to discern, has never been
extended specifically to include anything as being of purely municipal concern
except the functions of a city fire department and a city waterworks commission.
The according of limited recognition to the concept of the inherent rights
doctrine of local govermnent in Kentucky need not mean that very far-reaching
results will follow. The separation of powers doctrine will not disintegrate because
the court invalidates a few acts of the legislature without any express constitutional
authorization. But technically, the theory that a state legislature is restricted by
implied extra-constitutional limitations in connection with the cities which it has
created is unsound. Furthermore, the inherent rights doctrine would seem to
need a stronger basis than the changing attitude of the Court of Appeals. Perhaps
a "home rule" constitutional amendment is the solution.
HOLLis E. EDMJONDS
CIVIL LIABILITY OF CHILD TO SUPPORT INDIGENT PARENT
IN KENTUCKY
The support of the aged has become a problem of great magnitude in recent
years. Nearly every state' has passed laws concernig the well being of indigent
parents of adult children who either cannot or will not provide for their parents
support. Many children, who are supported from birth, abandoned their aged
parents and these persons are left without proper support and become charges
of an already overburdened state. How does the law cope with this problem?
Is there a civil liability imposed upon adult children in Kentucky to support their
parents?
First, let it be understood that there is no common law duty to support one s
parent. One of the earlier English cases made this clear when it was said in
Rex v. Munden, "By the law of nature a man was bound to take care of his own
father and mother; but there being no temporal obligation to enforce that law of
nature, it was found necessary to establish it by Act of Parliament "° A Con-
"'Id. at 820, 79 S.W 2d at 219.
"'Board of Aldermen of City of Ashland v. Hunt, 284 Ky. 720, 145 S.W 2d
814 (1940).
'4 VEnmimE, AimRICAN FAILY LAws sec. 235 (1st ed. 1936).
1 Strange 190, 93 Eng. Rep. 465 (1719).
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necticut case3 decided in 1795 was perhaps the first case in this country to recog-
nize that there was no common law duty. This view was also early expressed in
Edwards and Wife v. Davis,' an action of indebitatus assumpsit for necessaries
which the plaintiff provided to the defendant's parents. The defendant, one of
eight children, was held liable by the lower court for one-eighth of the necessaries
furnished the parents. The court on appeal, however reversed, stating, "Now the
duty of a child, of sufficient ability to maintain its poor and indigent parents,
being an imperfect one, not enforced at the common law the statute remedy
is the only one to be resorted to."5 This view has been reiterated in modem times
by such recent cases as Gardner v. Hines (1946) and Couteau v. Couteau (1948).
Alabama and perhaps Louisiana are the only jurisdictions wluch seem to recognize
a common law duty to support indigent parents. The Alabama Court said, "[The
father is bound to support minor children] and it is therefore likewise the
duty of the child to support the parent if the parent is unable to support himself
and the child, and the child is able to do so."'
Modern statutes, however, create a legal duty to support an indigent parent
in nearly all jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions provide for civil liability; while
others provide for a criminal punishment. In some jurisdictions the adult child is
both civilly and criminally responsible for his parents; but in several jurisdictions,
the statutes provide no enforcement provisions.'
Kentucky is one of the jurisdictions which provides for the criminal liability
of the adult child. The Kentucky statute entitled, Support of Indigent Parent,
provides as follows:
"Any adult person residing in this state and having in this
state a parent who is destitute of means of subsistence and unable
because of old age, infirmity or illness to support umself or herself,
shall, after reasonable notice, proviae that parent with necessary shel-
ter, food, care and clothing, if he has, or is- able to earn, sufficient
means to do so.'
The enforcing provision for this statute provides:
"Any person who violates KRS 405.080 shall be impns-
oned at hard labor for not less than one nor more than six months;
but if, after the conviction and before sentence, the person appears
before the court in which he was convicted and gives bond to the
Commonwealth in the penal sum of five hundred dollars, with good
and sufficient surety approved by the court, conditioned that he will
furnish the parent with necessary and proper shelter, food, care and
clothing, the court shall suspend the sentence.""
The question presented is whether or not the criminal remedy is the exclusive
' Gilbert v. Lynes, 2 Root 168 (Conn. 1795).
' 16 Johns 281 (N. Y. 1819).
Id. at 285.
-- Otuo - 68 N.E. 2d 397 (1946).
77 N.Y.S. 2d 113 (1948); see also Duffy v. Yordi, 149 Cal. 140, 84 Pac. 838
(1906); 46 C. J. 1279.
'See Cooley v. Stringfellow, 164 Ala. 460, -- 51 So. 321, 323 (1909); Wil-
liams v. Williams, 202 Ala. 589, -- 81 So. 41, 42 (1919); Stieb v. Owens, 190
La. 517, -- 182 So. 660, 661 (1938).
94 VERNIER, AmERicAN FA-inLY LAws see. 235 (1st ed. 1986).
o Ky. REV. STAT .sec. 405.080 (1948).
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 405.990 (5) (1948).
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one; or may a civil action also be brought to force the child to aid in the parent's
support.
Vernier, in his exhaustive study, Amerean Family Laws, declares that, "It is
generally held that the enforcement provisions contained in the statutes are ex-
clusive."' An early New York case takes this view and holds that, " the stat-
ute having prescribed the manner in which it is to be enforced and, the extent
of the penalty, the statute remedy is the only one to be resorted to."'" In Gardner
v. Hines,1 a son-in-law sought to recover from his brother-in-law amounts ex-
pended in supporting his mother. The court demed the recovery and said, "The
civil liability of a child who has sufficient ability to support an infirm, destitute,
or aged parent depends upon the existence of a statute, or upon contract. While
Section 12429, General Code, provides a criminal liability for the failure of a
child to support an indigent parent, there is no statute in Ohio creating a civil
liability.""
In Kentucky, the imposition in other situations of a criminal penalty generally
does not preclude damages in a civil suit, by virtue of an express statutory pro-
vision."6 This was applied in Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 7 where the plaintiff
purchased seed which was supposed to be alfalfa, but instead the sack contained
sweet clover seed. A statute prohibited the mislabeling of seed, but here no
samples were tested as required before prosecuting for violation of the statute; the
court in a civil action allowed recovery, saying,
1 it may be said at the outset that whatever may be
the effect of a violation of a penal statute, where there is no express
conferring of a right of action to one injured as a consequence thereof,
this court, since the enactment of section 446, supra, has, under van-
ous circumstances, sustained causes of- action based upon violations
of penal statutes, when it was alleged and proven that plaintiff proxi-
mately sustained injuries by reason thereof."'
The court limited this somewhat by deciding that the duty imposed must be for
the benefit of the person damaged before he can maintain a suit.
It seems, therefore, that in order to deterrmne whether or not the adult child
is civilly liable, we must determine what the legislature intended.
If the intent of the Kentucky Legislature was to protect the public from the
burden of supporting people who have children abl' to support them, as in Duffy
v. Yordi," a Califorma case, then no civil liability would attach since "a statute
which does not purport to establish a civil liability, but merely makes provision
to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, is not subject to a con-
struction establishing a civil liability."" It might create a civil liability enforceable
by the state alone upon the theory of the Graham case;" that is, that the state is
1" See. 285 at 94 (1st ed. 1936).
"Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns 281, 285 (N. Y. 1819).
"- Ohio - 68 N.E. 2d 397 (1946).
Id. at - 68 N.E. 2d 398.
Ky. REv. STAT. see. 446.070, "A person injured by the violation of any
statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason
of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation."
7 288 Ky. 96, 36 S.W 2d 859 (1931).
"Id. at 106, 36 S.W 2d 863.
"149 Calif. 140, 84 Pac. 838 (1906).
50 Amr. Jun. 582, sec. 586.
"Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 288 Ky. 96, 36 S.W 2d 859 (1931).
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the one for whose benefit the statute is imposed and therefore could claim that
Kentucky Revised Statutes Section 446.070 allows recovery.-- If, on the other
hand, the intent of the Kentucky Legislature was to benefit the indigent parent, as
was the case in Bismarck Hospital and Deaconesses Home v. Harrs,= or those who
are forced to support him, then it seems that again the Graham case would apply
and the suit could be maintained by the parent or by this third person.
It seems that the latter view would more nearly be the intention of the legis-
lature when they enacted this statute calling for support of parents. There is a
common law duty' of parents to support their infant children as well as a statu-
tory duty.' It would seem that the legislature intended to create by the statute
the same degree of support for aged parents as exists for minor children. The
purpose of this act is security and protection of the aged rather than punishment
of the young. Even if it be conceded that a secondary purpose of the legislature
was to protect the Commonwealth and to remove from its shoulder the burden of
supporting the aged parents of adult children, the moving factor and the prime
purpose of this legislation is the protection of aged parents who are destitute. The
1906 Kentucky Legislature was surely looking at human interests rather than the
mere saving of a few dollars for the state. It was the logical intention that even
third persons, who supply what the child should supply, have a like cause of action
either based on subrogation or that the child has breached the duty and the third
person is the real party in interest.
Perhaps this would be mere speculation were it not for the case of Wood v.
Wheat,' which is in fact the only Kentucky case in which the civil liability under
this support statute has been ruled upon. Here a daughter brought an action
against her brothers and sisters to compel contribution for the support which she
had furnished their mother who was unable to support herself. The court demed
recovery, but only because no notice had been given to the other children that she
was expecting them to aid in their mother s support. The court said in clear and
convincing language that the statute created a duty giving rise to a right which
could be enforced civilly. The court said,
" but, where support is voluntarily provided by one
child, when no pumshment is imminent or prosecution pending, if it
is desired to hold the others liable, we think it essential that notice
be given to the effect that the delinquent children will be expected
to bear their share of the burden. In the absence of such notice, the
delinquent children may be justified in assurnink that the other child
is performing the filial duty voluntarily and without any expectation
of reward or reimbursement. There is authority to the effect that
such a statute may be enforced only in the mode pointed out by its
terms. 29 Cyc. 1620. But, as the statute imposes a duty, the per-
formance of that duty creates a right, which may be enforced, as any
other right, by appropriate action by one entitled to maintain it."'
(Italics writers).
The court goes on to show that the intent of the law is to protect the indigent
parent and that third persons aiding such parent should be protected.
- Statute set out in full supra, note 15.
=68 N. D. 374, 280 N.W 423 (1938).
- 46 C. J. 1270.
'Ky. ltv. STAT. sees. 405.030, 405.040 (1938).
"'226 Ky. 762, 11 S.W 2d 916 (1928).Id. at 765, 11 S.W 2d at 918.
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"These cases proceed on the principle that the suffering
of indigent persons shall be relieved when they may be found in a
destitute condition, and that advancements made for such purposes
are justly chargeable in equity and conscience to the person whose
relation towards the indigent person under the statute creates a duty
or imposes the necessity of furmshing aid, and such obligation, when
neglected or disregarded by those who should perform it may be
enforced in favor of whomsoever grants the relief as for money paid
out and expended for another s benefit, provided they are not mere
volunteers. ' '"
This case clearly shows that the Kentucky Court of Appeals has decided that
the statutory remedy is not exclusive and that the court does not believe that the
legislature so intended. Having established the existence of a civil duty, let us
look briefly at its extent and prerequisites.
1. May a third person maintain the action against the adult child to recover
for necessaries given an indigent parent? As to this point, Wood v. Wheat is dic-
tum, but it is strongly worded so as to indicate that the court believed such a right
existed. Such an action should be allowed because, if a third person does aid
the parent, he is the one who is hurt by the failure of the child to live up to his
duty. To allow him to sue would also prevent the circuitous action of the parent
suing the child and then the third person suing, if necessary, on the debt to re-
cover from the parent.
2. Must notice be given the non-supporting child? If the action is being
brought by one child against another, Wood v. Wheat would apply and notice
would be a prerequisite to recovery. Where one child provides for the parent it
might well be argued that there is ample reason to require notice, since it would
be presumed that his support was furnished gratuitously, and the non-supporting
child should have equal opportunity to supply the needs of the indigent parent.
This reasomng, however, would not apply in the case of a third party. It is sub-
mitted that notice should not be required in either case since to so require would
in many cases allow the child to escape a duty that is placed upon him bv law.
3. What if the non-supporting child has a small income? Clearly, the child
would not be required to slipport the parent if he is unable to do so. The statute
is clear on this point and it is the only logical view as the child's financial future
should not be jeopardized to any great extent.'
4. Should a court provide for future support? Two factors must be considered
in answering this question. First, failure to provide for future support could
create an annoying multiplicity of actions in that failure to so provide might com-
pel the supplier to bring separate actions periodically as the necessaries were fur-
nished. Second, the fture expenditures are speculative and the court would
hesitate to determine what they might be. Weighing the first factor, the great
nuisance of possible multiple actions, against the possibility of mitigating the
second factor by entering a decree, similar to an award of alimony, based on
average expenditures in the past and subject to reduction or increase upon a future
change of circumstances, the preferable solution to the question would permit the
court to provide in its decree for future support of the indigent parent.
There is no common law duty of an adult child to support his parent. Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes 405.080 creates a duty and 405.990 (5) provides a criminal
2 Id. at 766, 11 S.W 2d at 918.
4 VERNiER, AMERiCAN FAnILY LAWs sec. 235 (1st ed. 1936).
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punishment. The criminal punishment is not exclusive and a civil action may be
maintained. It seems that this civil action can be maintained by third persons.
Notice is necessary if the suit is brought by another child but may not be neces-
sary if the action is brought by third persons. Future support should be allowed
to prevent multiplicity of actions and should be similar to a decree for alimony.
GERALD ROBIN GRIFFIN
KENTUCKY'S OBSOLETE LAW ON GIFTS BY DEBTORS
The Statute of Elizabeth,' progenitor of most modem statutes and case law
concerning conveyances deemed fraudulent as to creditors, declared broadly that
every conveyance and gift made with the "intent to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors and others is void." Thus the sole criterion for declaring a conveyance
within the operation of the statute was whether there was an intent on the part
of the grantor to delay or defraud his creditors. Literally interpreted, the statute
makes of no consequence the fact that a conveyance would have the effect of
delaying or defrauding a creditor unless there is also present the requisite intent.
Nevertheless the courts have uniformly held that a gift, or a voluntary conveyance
without consideration, made while the financial position of the debtor is such
that the payment of creditors is necessarily defeated, as where the debtor is in-
solvent or is rendered thereby insolvent, is fraudulent as a matter of law without
regard to actual intent of the debtor.' From a practical standpoint there can be
no quarrel with this holding. An irresponsible person should not be permitted to
dissipate completely his assets by gifts leaving his creditors without any assets on
which to realize their claims.
A more difficult problem is what effect mere indebtedness without near in-
solvency of the donor should have upon the validity of a gift as against con-
temporaneous creditors. Two views have been developed by courts interpreting
theStatute of Elizabeth or its successors as to this problem. The holdings are
that the voluntary conveyance (1) is presumed to be fraudulent with respect to
the existing debt and no circumstance will suffice to repel the legal presumption
of fraud,' and (2) is merely prima facie fraudulent3
As early as 1836, Kentucky laid down without reservation the rule that
voluntary conveyances were conclusively fraudulent as to antecedent creditors
and the court has followed it undeviatingly until the present time.' In Hanson v.
Buckners Devisees,' the first case holding squarely on this point, the court said:
"And the presumption of law as to prior debts, does not
depend upon the amount of the debts, the intentions, or circumstances
of the party conveying, or the amount of property conveyed. The law
'3 ELiz., c. 5 (1540).
Although there were earlier statutes for the protection of creditors such as
50 Enw. III, c. 6 (1376) and 3 HEN. VII, c. 4 (1488), the statute of 13 ELiz. is
the starting point for most discussions of fradulent conveyances.
I GLENN, THE LA-W OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-S sec. 269 (1940).
4 GLENN, OP. cit. supra, note 3, at sec. 268.
'GLENN, OP. cit. supra, note 3; 37 C. J. S. 935, 936.
' Damels v. Goff, 192 Ky. 15, 232 S.W 66 (1921); Townsend v. Wilson, 114
Ky. 504, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1276, 7-1 S.W 440 (1903); Miller v. Desha, 66 Ky.
(3 Bush) 212 (1867); Trimble v. Ratcliff, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 511 (1849). The
paucity of recent cases on this point is further evidence of the rigidity of this rule.
